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This paper analyzes whether the three-point rule in soccer brought
more action to the game for a large sample of European championships
in 1990-1997, revealing team-speci￿c heterogeneity of responses caused by
di￿erences in team tactics in the period prior to the rule change. Teams
that relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics dramatically changed their
behavior towards more attacking style in away games, considerably reduc-
ing probability of a tie. Interestingly, even though the three-point rule
signi￿cantly reduced proportion of ties, it did not bring more goals into
the game because the increased rewards of scoring when the current score
is tied were o￿set by increased incentives of defending the current score
when one team led.
JEL codes: C40, L51, L83
Keywords: Heterogeneous response; Soccer; Sports; Three-point sys-
tem
1 Introduction
NAPLES, Fla. (CP) - The NHL’s 30 general managers have given
a thumbs down to the idea of awarding teams three points for a
win. "Because it’s a terrible idea," Anaheim general manager Brian
Burke said Wednesday as three days of GM meetings wrapped up.
"They tried this in British soccer and everything I’ve heard is that
it didn’t make a di￿erence."
In the middle of the 90’s, The FØdØration Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), the world soccer government body, recommended all national soccer fed-
erations to reward three points for a win in national tournament games instead
1of two points under the old rule. ￿Public statements by FIFA o￿cials indicated
that...they were increasing the rewards for wins while hoping for more scor-
ing￿ [Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005]. The push for more scoring aimed
at counteracting the long term trend of declining in goals per game that has
started after the 1954 World Cup when 5.4 goals per game was scored and hit
the rock bottom in the 1990 World Cup in Italy with only 2.2 goals per game
1, making the game less exciting for fans.
Did the three-point system in soccer make a di￿erence? Was it a terrible
idea, as Brian Burke said? The questions have been investigated for Portugal
[Guedes and Machado, 2002], Spain [Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2005], and
Germany [Dilger and Geyer, 2009], with the general conclusion that the three-
point rule has brought two o￿setting incentives. On the one hand, when the
game is tied, the three-point rule encourages more o￿ensive tactics for both
teams. On the other hand, when a team leads, it has incentives to play more
defensively than under the old regulations. On aggregate, the three-point rule
has very small impact on the number of goals per game.
This paper investigates the impact of the change in the rule of assigning
points on game outcomes and the tournament strategies, looking at a larger
dataset of games in eight European countries 2 from 1990 to 1997. It argues
that there is no common response of heterogeneous teams to the change in the
rule. The e￿ect of the three-point rule considerably varies from one country
to another, depending on the proportion of games that ended up as ties in
the period prior to introduction of the new rule. Therefore, it is di￿cult to
generalize the impact of the three-point rule, by looking at evidence from just
one country. Moreover, it turns out that Portugal, Spain, and Germany were
among European championships the least a￿ected by the change.
Moschini [2010], is the only paper the author is aware of that looked at data
for 35 countries and found a statistically signi￿cant increase in the number of
goals and decrease in the percentage of ties caused by the rule change. How-
ever, the paper looked at the aggregate data and could not reveal important
heterogeneity of responses across teams. The identi￿cation strategy in this pa-
per utilizes the cross-country variation in timing of introducing the three-point
system, as well as, cross-team variation in the intensity of ties for the period be-
fore the change had been introduced. The usage of team-pair ￿xed e￿ects allows
looking at the within team-pair speci￿c e￿ects caused by the rule change, the
strategy that is not possible for the aggregate data. The main ￿nding is highly
heterogeneous reaction to the new rule in di￿erent countries and for di￿erent
teams, linked to the initial proportion of ties in the national soccer competitions
and reliance of teams on tie-intensive tactics prior to the change.
1In European club competitions, there was a similar trend. Internazionale Milan that
dominated European and national competitions in 60’s applied catenaccio ￿ an extremely
defensive tactics ￿ that helped them winning two European and three national titles. The
defensive security is the primary objective of catenaccio. A team that utilizes this strategy
would try hard to score in the beginning of the game and then, with a lead of 1-0, would
implement catenaccio.
2Countires are Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and
Spain.
2The investigated question is closely related to the literature on heterogeneous
responses of economic agents to the changes in policies [Heckman, 2001], some-
times leading to consequences unintended by policymakers. In Melitz [2003],
trade liberalization leads to expansion of more productive ￿rms but causes least
productive ￿rms to close down. Rajan and Zingales [1998] showed that ￿nan-
cial development is the most inductive for growth of more ￿nancially dependent
industries. In this paper, a similar identi￿cation strategy is applied. Since the
three-point rule had made a tie less attractive outcome, teams that used more
tie-intensive tactics had stronger incentives to switch to more aggressive tactics.
After the change in the rule, the game where the away team is in the fourth
quartile according to tie-intensities are 11 percent more likely to end up as the
home win and 15 percent less likely to end up as the tie.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives literature
review. Section 3 presents some stylized facts and describe data. Section 4
develops a model and discusses the identi￿cation strategy. Section 5 presents
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
The philosophy of soccer emphasizes the maintenance of balance between o￿ense
and defense. The fact that teams score approximately 2.6 goals combined per
game makes each goal very valuable and discourages teams from placing too
many resources into o￿ensive e￿orts. At the same time, there has been the
overall trend of declining average number of goals per game throughout most
of the 20th century from above 4 goals per game to current 2.6 goals per game.
The trend is illustrated at Figure 1, which reports average number of goals per
game scored in World Cups from 1930 to 2006. The trend become apparent
in the 1960’s when Italian teams who dominated the international club soccer
competition applied catenaccio tactics. Catenaccio is built on protecting one’s
goal as a priority and attacking the opponent’s goal as a secondary objective.
The success of catenaccio in Italy and internationally ￿ Italy and Argentina
were examples of defensively-minded teams that successfully played in the World
Cups ￿ forced other teams to play more defensive soccer as well, reducing the
average number of goals between 1960’s and 1980’s.
A closely related problem was high proportion of ties, especially 0-0 and
1-1 ties, in national tournaments that became more pronounced in the 1970’s.
Some National Soccer Federations were even forced to introduced measures,
speci￿cally targeting the ties . For instance, in the USSR, the cap on the
maximum number of draws per season had been in place from 1978 till 1988; a
point for a tie has not been awarderd for teams that exceeded the limit which
was initially set as 8 ties per season and later softened to 10 ties per season. The
cap had been introduced after the 1977 season when proportion of ties reached
44 percent amidst the accusations of game ￿xing that involved trading of ties
between teams in home and away games.
In the beginning of the 1990’s, promoting more aggressive soccer and ob-
3Figure 1: Scoring per game in World Cups, 1930-2006
serving the experience of the English Premiership league that introduced the
three-point rule in the 1980’s, the European soccer body UEFA recommended
awarding three points for a win instead of two points as under the old rule.
By 1996, the new system was universally adopted in all countries under the
guidance of the international soccer organization, FIFA. While there is some
evidence that this change reduced proportion of ties, the e￿ect has had a mini-
mal impact on scoring. To explain the puzzle, Brocas and Carrillo [2004] set up
a dynamic game model to study the implications of the three-point rule on the
￿ow of soccer games. They showed that when a team is in the lead the incentive
for the team to play o￿ensively may be lower under the three-point rule than
under the two-point rule because of the higher expected loss of losing the lead
in the game under the new rule.
The empirical estimation of the impact of the three-point rule on games
outcomes got attention in the literature [Dilger and Geyer, 2009, Guedes and
Machado, 2002, Moschini, 2010, Palacios-Huerta, 2004]. An empirical challenge
that researchers are facing is the problem of establishing a causal relationship
that goes from changing the rule to changing outcomes of the game. The change
in the rule can coincide in time with other important game-related changes such
as further commercialization of the game, technological improvements in pro-
ducing soccer balls 3 and medical improvements in preparing athletes, changes
3￿Yet, grab a soccer ball from 1960, or even one from 1980 or 1990, and the orb is virtually
4in tactics and strategy, and changing tastes of fans. Under such circumstances
it is quite di￿cult to disentangle the impact of changing rules from all other
factors. Palacios-Huerta [2004] applied a test for structural breaks in time-series
to more than a century long series of English soccer data. The results indicated
that in 1982 ￿ the year when the English Football Association has introduced
the three-point rule ￿ the structural breaks had occurred for percentage of wins
and ties, however, there were no breaks in the average number of goals.
More traditional parametric approach found similar evidence of the impact
of the three-point rule on game outcomes. Garicano and Palacios-Huerta [2005],
who studied Spanish league games, argued that the new rule ￿ introduced to
encourage more attacking play and higher number of goals per game ￿ actually
produced two e￿ects: more attacking e￿orts, observed for example in 10 percent
increase in shots on goals, as well as more defensive e￿orts, such as the 12.5
percent increase in the number of fouls per game. 4 The two e￿ects o￿set each
other and the number of goals per game has not changed due to the new rule.
Also, there were no statistically signi￿cant changes in the percentage of tied
games. To identify the e￿ect, the same teams playing in the National Cup
competition were considered as a reference group, because the rule change did
not a￿ect the National Cup rules.
Dilger and Geyer [2009] used a similar technique to analyze the German
league and con￿rmed the decrease in the percentage of ties. Guedes and Machado
[2002] studied the e￿ects of the new rule on team strategies in the Portuguese
￿rst division league. Even though the average number of goals per game in-
creased from 2.40 to 2.60, or by 8.5%, the favorites scored 13.4% more goals
and losers scored only 1.3% more. Guedes and Machado [2002] concluded that
the new rule has a non-uniform impact on top teams versus lesser teams. Mos-
chini [2010] looked at 30 years of data for 35 countries and found a statistically
signi￿cant increase in the number of goals and decrease in percentage of ties.
However, the main drawback of the paper is the analysis of aggregated ￿nal
standings rather than microdata of actual games.
3 Model
Suppose that a home team i plays against an away team j. ai and aj characterize
o￿ensive abilities of the teams, while di and dj characterize their defensive
abilities. The scoring potential of team i in a game against team j de￿ned as
unrecognizable from the one that will be used for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa in June
and July. Leather has given way to synthetics. Some 32 individually sewn panels have become
eight. Hand stitching has given way to thermal bonding. The result is a faster-than-ever ball
for a faster-than-ever game that allows players to attempt laser-like strikes from 40 yards, and
precise long-distance passes that would have been impossible with a ball from the 1960s or
1970s.￿ Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2010
4￿soccer clubs reoptimized and changed their behavior in response to stronger incentives,
but that they did this largely in a manner undesired by the principal: they engaged in more
sabotage activities and managed to decrease the output desired by the principal.￿ [Garicano
and Palacios-Huerta, 2005]
5the number of goals scored by the home team, Gij, is
Gij = h + g(ai;dj) + ij (1)
where h > 0 represents the home ￿eld advantage 5. Function g(a;d) trans-
forms the abilities of the teams into expected number of goals scored by the
attacking team, having the following properties g1 > 0, g11 < 0, g2 < 0, and
g11 < 0. The error term ij = Ht + Hij + ij consists of the time e￿ect Ht,
pair-speci￿c e￿ect Hij, and the random term ij  (0;2
) is an independent
identically distributed shock that includes the impact of such unobservable fac-
tors as luck, weather conditions, referee quali￿cation etc.
Analogously, the number of goals scored by the away team, Qij, is
Qij = g(aj;di) + ij (2)
The error term ij = At+Aij+'ij consists of the time e￿ect At, pair-speci￿c
e￿ect Aij, and the random term ij  (0;2
) is an independent identically
distributed shock.
Suppose further that the function g takes log-linear form g = ln(a)+ln(d).
The probability of win for the home team is
P(winijt) = P(Gijt > Qijt) = FW(h+ln(ai=aj)+ln(dj=di)+Dt+Dij) (3)
where F is logistic cdf, Dt = Ht   At, and Dij = Hij   Aij. Similarly, I de￿ne
equations for ties and losses as
P(tieijt) = P(Gijt = Qijt) = FT(h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij)
and
P(lossijt) = P(Gijt < Qijt) = FL(h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij)
.
To introduce strategic considerations of teams and test whether they are
important parts of team’s motivation, we add a strategy related variable Rct
that takes value of 1 if the soccer tournament in county c at time t is played
under the three-point rule, and takes value of 0 otherwise. The probability of a
certain outcome, O = Win;Tie;Loss, is modi￿ed as follows
P(Oijt) = FO(Rct + h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij) (4)
.
To evaluate the impact of the three-point rule on scoring of home and away
teams, I estimate the poisson regressions of the following form
GFijt = Rct + h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij + ijt (5)
5The median value of the home ￿eld advantage in the sample is 1, while the average value
is 0.62
6and
GAijt = Rct + h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij + !ijt (6)
where GFijt and GAijt are goals scored for and against in the game between
teams i and j in the season t.
Finally, to look if the three-point rule has a heterogeneous e￿ect on di￿erent
teams, I estimate the following model
P(Oijt) = FO(0Rct + 1Rct  tiei + 2Rct  tiei + (7)
h + ln(ai=aj) + ln(dj=di) + Dt + Dij)
where tiei and tiej are average proportions of ties of home and away teams in the
period before the three-point rule has been introduced and O = Win;Tie;Loss.
As an illustration, a negative signs of 1 and 2 for the probability of a tie would
indicate that teams pursuing a strategy of drawing a tie more extensively before
the new rule has been introduced, has switched to a more aggresive tactics.
As the main objective, the two following hypotheses are tested.
Hypothesis 1. H0 :  = 0. Teams do not consider tournament strategies
and use a ￿naive￿ maximum e￿ort tactics.
Hypothesis 2. H0 : 1 = 0;2 = 0. Teams with higher share of ties in the
period prior to the rule change do not respond to the new rule more strongly
relative to other teams.
Unconditionally, the new rule discourages ties because it is not optimal to
tie in the tournament settings when the team’s objective is to win the tourna-
ment. However, over the course of the game, the new rule encourages attacking
mode only when the current score is tied. When one team leads, the new rule
discourages attacking mode for the leading team relative to the two-points per
win, while it has only an indirect e￿ect on the incentives for the team that
trails behind, stemming from the strategic considerations over the course of a
season. As a result, the overall e￿ect on the number of goals scored is not clear.
However, the three-point rule does reduce probability of a 0-0 score towards 1-0
and 0-1 outcomes, and reduce probability of a 1-1 score towards 1-2 and 2-1
scores. Also, the three-point rule impact is stronger for teams that were more
intensively using defensive tactics trying to draw a tie in the period before the
three-point rule has been introduced.
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 Data source
The unit of observation is a game between a home team i and away team j in a
year t. I observe the game outcome ￿ win, tie, or loss from the standpoint of the
home team i ￿ and number of goals for and against the home team. I also have
the ￿nal standings of all teams in a season, total number of games per season,
7total number of wins, ties, and losses per season, and total number of goals for
and against. The initial sample covers 18,712 games that were played in the
top soccer divisions of eight European countries from 1990 to 1997. The time
coverage slightly varies across countries ￿ 1990-1997 for France, Germany, Italy,
Romania, and Spain, 1990-1996 for Poland, and 1993-1997 for Netherlands and
Portugal6. Data for Poland are available from http://www.rsssf.com/. For all
other countries two sources are used: http://www.sportamok.com for 1990-1992,
and http://www.football-data.co.uk/data for 1993-1997.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics before and after the rule has been
changed. The ￿rst column presents the number of games played during the
investigated period in each country. The other columns report proportion of
home wins, ties and home losses, average goals scored and conceded by the
home team. The proportion of the home wins barely changed increasing from
0.5 to 0.51. This number is quite stable across countries, except Romania with
the proportion of home wins at 0.65. The proportion of ties dropped from 0.3
under the old rule to 0.26 under the new rule. Importantly, the highest decline in
the proportion of ties occurred in France, Italy, and Poland ￿ countries that had
a higher than average proportion of ties before the new rule has been introduced.
The home losses increased from 0.20 to 0.23, meaning that most adjustments
in the game strategy under the new rule came from a more aggressive game
tactics utilized by away teams. The shift in the outcomes from ties to home
wins and losses almost did not change the average number of goals per game.
The average number of goals scored by the home team increased from 1.58 to
1.63 goals per game, while the average number of goals conceded by the home
team increased from 0.95 to 1.03 goals per game.
Statistics of game outcomes reveal high degree of heterogeneity of champi-
onships with respect to the initial distribution of wins, ties and losses, and, as I
would argue, led to heterogeneous responses in the equilibrium strategies that
occurred after introduction of the new rule. In France, Italy, and Poland, the
game style was initially skewed towards a defensive strategy, meaning that play-
ers assign more attention and e￿ort to destroying the opponent’s attempts to
score rather than trying to score themselves. This strategy lead to higher share
of ties, 0-0 and 1-1 outcomes particularly common, and lower number of goals
per game. Since the relative attractiveness of a tie has been reduced under the
new rule, French, Italian, and Polish teams had more incentives to adjust their
game style away from the strategies that were successful in producing ties and
towards a more attacking style, and they actually did adjust considerably. Ger-
many, Netherlands, and Romania, were examples of the other extreme, where
most teams prefer attacking style with more goals per game and, as a result,
lower number of ties. This group of countries had fewer incentives to change,
which showed up in the data. Finally, Spain and Portugal are examples of soccer
tournaments with more balanced strategies.
Also, there are important strategic considerations related to the whole tour-
6Year is given for the beginning of a season. The season starts in summer of one year and
ends in spring of the next year. For example, the year 1997 in my sample corresponds to the
season 1997/1998
8nament strategy that had been changed due to the introduction of the new rule.
Under the old system, a French, Italian, or Polish team pursuing a strategy of
winning all home games and drawing a tie in all away games would become the
champion in half of the cases and come second in the nine out of ten cases,
while under the new rule the same tournament strategy would typically bring
the third place7.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of game outcomes under two- and three-point
systems
Country N Win Tie Loss Goals for Goals against
2 pts 3 pts 2 pts 3 pts 2 pts 3 pts 2 pts 3 pts 2 pts 3 pts 2 pts 3 pts
France 1519 1446 0.49 0.50 0.34 0.29 0.18 0.22 1.41 1.48 0.79 0.89
Germany 1604 918 0.47 0.46 0.31 0.29 0.23 0.25 1.71 1.66 1.15 1.20
Italy 1224 1224 0.45 0.49 0.35 0.28 0.19 0.22 1.49 1.60 0.94 1.04
Netherlands 612 918 0.48 0.48 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.28 1.82 1.78 1.26 1.25
Poland 1223 917 0.45 0.49 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.24 1.45 1.50 0.94 0.96
Portugal 595 918 0.53 0.50 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.24 1.52 1.56 0.89 0.98
Romania 1224 1224 0.65 0.65 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.18 1.81 1.91 0.77 0.93
Spain 1842 1304 0.51 0.47 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.25 1.52 1.60 0.94 1.11
Total 9843 8869 0.50 0.51 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.23 1.58 1.63 0.95 1.03
Notes: Table reports number of games before and after introduction of three-point per win rule,
proportion of games won by the home team, proportion of games tied, proportion of games lost,
average number of goals scored and conceded for eight European countries. Data for France,
Germany, Italy, Romania, and Spain are for 1990-1997. Data for Poland are for 1990-1996.
Data for Netherlands and Portugal are for 1993-1997. France, Italy, and Romania have switched
to the three-point system in the 1994/1995 season. All other countries have switched to the
three-point system in 1995-1996. Data for Poland are available from http://www.rsssf.com/. For
all other countries, two sources fo data are used: http://www.sportamok.com for 1990-1992, and
http://www.football-data.co.uk/data for 1993-1997.
Figure 1 gives an additional insight into the reaction of teams to the new rule
by showing the whole distribution of outcomes rather than just sample means.
It plots kernel densities of four variables: total points per season, wins per
season, draws per season, and losses per season normalized by the total number
of games. The sample is split into two parts and densities are constructed
separately for the periods before and after the change in the rule took place.
For comparability, the total points per season under the three-point-system were
converted to the total number of points under the two-point-system. Under the
new rule, the variance of the total number of points increased by small amount
mostly due to the changes in the upper part of distribution which hints that
7In the USSR, when 44 percent of all games in the 1977 season ended up as draws, general
manager Valeriy Lobanovskij was accused of using such tactics. His team Dynamo Kiev won
the tournament with 14 wins and 15 ties, loosing just one game.
9the top teams bene￿ted more from the new rule. However, those changes were
quite small, indicating that the competitive balance in the European soccer had
not changed signi￿cantly during the investigated period 8. The most noticeable
change had occurred in the distribution of ties that shifted to the left. The
adjustment went through the rightward shift in the distributions of home wins
and home losses. More formally, I have tested for the equality of distributions of
total number of points, wins, ties, losses, goals for, and goals against before and
after the change. A set of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests rejects the equality of
distributions of wins, ties, and losses, but can not reject the hypothesis of the
equality of distributions in the total number of points, as well as, in the number
of goals scored for and against the home team.
4.2 What scores are more popular and how does it change
after introducing the three-point system?
Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of game outcomes before the three-
point was introduced calculated as a percentage of the total number of games.
The columns of the table are ordered in the number of goals scored by the home
team and the rows of the table are ordered in the number of goals scored by
the away team. The last column of the table displays the marginal distribution
of the goals scored by the home team while the last row of the table shows
the marginal distribution of the goals scored by the away team. Before the
introduction of the three-point rule, 13.56% of games ended up as a 1-1 draw,
12.15% as a 1-0 home win, and 11.28% as a 0-0 draw.
After the introduction of the new rule the rankings of the most popular
outcomes has been slightly changed as the panel B of Table 2 demonstrates.
It displays the same statistics after the new rule has been introduced for the
same group of countries. Under the new rule, 12.15% of games ended up as a 1-1
draw, 11.72% as a 1-0 home win, and 9.45% as a 2-0 home win, while a 0-0 draw
took the fourth place with 8.65% of all games. The panel C of Table 2 displays
the di￿erences between panels A and B. The three-point rule led to reduction in
such popular draw outcomes as 0-0, and 1-1 by a total of 4.04%. The adjustment
mostly came through the increase in the percentage of away wins 0-1, and 1-2 by
a total of 1.53%. The inspection of the marginal distributions gives as additional
insights: an outcome when one of the teams scores three or more goals became
more frequent and the e￿ect is more pronounced for away teams.
Initially, I conclude that the introduction of the new rule had the most impact
on incentives to score for away teams. When the game starts at 0-0, both teams
have more incentives to score under the new rule, because the bene￿ts of scoring
are higher ￿ two extra points to the team’s total number of points in the season
rather than one extra point under the old rule. However, once a team takes
a lead, it has more incentive to play defensively under the new rule, because
8Higher competitive balance measured as more equal distribution of total points across
teams in the tournament would be bene￿cial for soccer because it makes the oucome of the
game more uncertain and more fun to watch, leading to more spectators and as a result to








0 .5 1 1.5 2
Total points per season/total games












0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Wins per season/total games






0 .2 .4 .6
Draws per season/total games












0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Losses per season/total games
2 point 3 point
Notes: Kernel densities of four variables are presented ￿ total points per season, wins per season,
draws per season, and losses per season. Values are normalized by the total number of games to
account for di￿erence in the number of soccer clubs across countires. The sample is split into two
parts and densities are constructed separately for the periods before and after the change in the
rule took place. For comparability, the total points per season under the three-point system were
converted to the total points per season under the two-point system.
Figure 2: Distributions of game outcomes before and after change in point
assigning rule
11Table 2: Game outcomes before and after the change in the rule
A. Game outcomes under two-point rule, % of total number of games
Goals scored by away team
Goals scored 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
by home team
0 11.28 5.55 3.27 1.53 0.67 0.12 22.4
1 12.15 13.56 4.50 1.98 0.68 0.12 33.0
2 9.21 8.66 4.40 1.12 0.40 0.10 23.9
3 4.90 4.74 2.20 0.72 0.15 0.01 12.7
4 2.35 2.18 0.86 0.27 0.03 0.04 5.7
5 1.01 0.76 0.35 0.08 0.04 0.00 2.2
Total 40.9 35.5 15.6 5.7 2.0 0.4 100
B. Game outcomes under three-point rule, % of total number of games
Goals scored by away team
Goals scored 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
by home team
0 8.65 6.45 3.52 1.65 0.63 0.27 21.2
1 11.72 12.15 5.13 2.37 0.74 0.19 32.3
2 9.45 8.46 4.55 1.32 0.57 0.17 24.5
3 5.17 5.07 2.49 0.71 0.25 0.08 13.8
4 2.08 2.24 0.97 0.33 0.07 0.05 5.7
5 0.95 0.92 0.42 0.13 0.06 0.01 2.5
Total 38.0 35.3 17.1 6.5 2.3 0.8 100
C. Changes in games outcomes after switch to three-point system
Goals scored by away team
Goals scored 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
by home team
0 -2.63 0.90 0.25 0.12 -0.04 0.15 -1.24
1 -0.43 -1.41 0.63 0.39 0.06 0.07 -0.70
2 0.24 -0.20 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.63
3 0.27 0.33 0.29 -0.01 0.10 0.07 1.06
4 -0.27 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
5 -0.06 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.24
Total -2.88 -0.16 1.51 0.80 0.35 0.38 0.00
Notes: Table reports distribution of outcomes of a match between home and away teams as well
as distribution of goals scored by one team conditional on the number of goals scored by the other
team. They are calculated as a percentage of games with a certain outcome in the total number of
games under di￿erent point systems. Games where at least one of the teams scored more then 6
goals are not considered.
12it would lose two points if the opponent scores. This line of reasoning is more
relevant to model the away team’s behavior, because the home team usually
chose an attacking mode due to the e￿ect of home team advantage and fan’s
expectations of watching attacking actions from their team.
5 Results
For each observation, I observe information on the number of goals scored, Sijt,
and conceded, Cijt, by the home team. I also observe information on the ￿nal
standings of each team represented by its rank in the end of the season and
total number of goals scored, TSiT, and conceded, TCiT, by the team.
To measure o￿ensive and defensive abilities of teams i and j, I construct














where TGiT and TGiT are the total number of games played by teams i
and j in season T. I eliminate the impact of the current game to avoid the
problem of endogeneity of the explanatory variables due to the fact that the
current result directly enters into calculations of the totals.
Table 3 reports estimation of equations 4, 5, and 6 for the following outcomes
￿ wins, ties, losses, goals scored for and against the home team. Results suggest
no signi￿cant impact of the new rule on all dependent variables, except the
probability of drawing a tie which has reduced by 6 percent after the new rule
has been introduced. The relative attack and defense variables are signi￿cant
and have expected signs.
Introducing interaction of the team-speci￿c proportion of ties for the period
before the three-point rule has been introduced with the three-point rule indica-
tor variable reveals that the change in the rule had more pronounced e￿ect for
teams that had higher proportion of tied games. Table 4 reports the regression
estimates of the e￿ect of the three point rule as well as on the e￿ect of the
interaction terms on wins, ties, losses, goals for, and goals against controlling
for relative attacking and defensive skills, time e￿ects, and team-pair e￿ects.
More tie-intensive teams, i.e. Genoa, Roma, and Torino from Italy and Lille
and Martiques from France, are less likely to draw a tie after the three-point
rule has been introduced regardless of whether they play at home or away. In-
terestingly, more tie-intensive teams are more likely to lose the game on the road
after the three-point rule has been introduced because more attacking tactics is
not their ￿natural￿ mode of play. Therefore, the more aggressive tactics selected
by tie-intensive away teams makes them more vulnerable to failure.
An approach, alternative to including the interaction terms, is to split the
sample according to the tie-intensity of teams and run the same regressions
13Table 3: Impact of the three-point rule on game outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Win Tie Loss Goals for Goals against
Three point (d) 0.047 -0.065* 0.020 0.054 0.066
(0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.037) (0.048)
Relative attack 0.14** -0.038* -0.15** 0.22** -0.25**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.034)
Relative defence 0.18** -0.039* -0.19** 0.22** -0.22**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.033)
Log. like -5428.2 -4844.3 -3757.6 -16806.6 -13323.3
Observations 13515 12291 10323 16541 16008
Marginal e￿ects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes: Table reports logit (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and poisson (Columns 4 and 5) regression
estimates of the e￿ect of changing the point rule on games outcome - probability of win, tie,
and loss, as well as goals scored for and against the home team. All models include time- and
team-pair ￿xed e￿ects. Relative attack and defence variables control for the di￿erence in o￿ensive
and defensive abilities of teams during the current season.
on separate samples. This approach allows more ￿exibility when evaluating
heterogeneous responses of teams. I split the sample into four groups according
to the quartiles of tie-intensities of away teams because according to the results
in Table 4 the away teams are actually more sensitive to the change in the rule.
Table 5 shows that after the change in the rule the game where away team is
in the fourth quartile according to tie-intensities are 11 percent more likely to
end up as the home win and 15 percent less likely to end up as the tie. Again,
this result reiterates the previous conclusion that teams that were engaged in
tie-intensive strategies under the two point rule were forced to switch to more
aggressive game. In addition, they became more vulnerable and su￿ered higher
proportion of defeats.
Finally, proportion of ties before the three point rule has been introduced
signi￿cantly di￿ered across countries. France, Poland and Italy had the highest
proportion of ties of 0.33 and above, while Romania had the lowest proportion of
0.21. Table 6 reports estimates of the impact of the change in the rule on games
outcomes for each country in the sample. As expected, the rule change had
signi￿cant negative impact on the probability of tie in Poland (by -17 percent),
France (by -16 percent), and Italy (by -10 percent). Quite unexpectedly, the
probability of tie has decline by 10 percent in the Netherlands as well. In
all other countries the e￿ect is insigni￿cant. Another important result is a
considerable increase in the probability of loss by the home team in France and
Romania (by 21 percent), Italy (18 percent), and Spain (by 11 percent). The
increase in the probability of loss in those countries came from more aggressive
14Table 4: Interacting the three-point rule with the team-speci￿c tie intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Win Tie Loss Goals for Goals against
Three point (d) -0.15** 0.22** -0.058 -0.054 0.066
(0.056) (0.059) (0.067) (0.080) (0.11)
Three point x share of ties i 0.30 -0.37* -0.0033 -0.014 0.043
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.24) (0.30)
Three point x share of ties j 0.41* -0.60** 0.22 0.41 -0.10
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.23) (0.31)
Relative attack 0.15** -0.033 -0.16** 0.23** -0.26**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035)
Relatve defence 0.18** -0.042* -0.18** 0.21** -0.22**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.034)
Log. like -5129.8 -4601.5 -3542.2 -15855.8 -12563.5
Observations 12709 11660 9721 15274 14835
Marginal e￿ects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes: Table reports logit (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and poisson (Columns 4 and 5) regression
estimates of the e￿ect of changing the point rule on games outcome - probability of win, tie,
and loss, as well as goals scored for and against the home team ￿ interacting with team speci￿c
proportions of ties for the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. All models
include time- and team-pair ￿xed e￿ects. Relative attack and defence variables control for the
di￿erence in o￿ensive and defensive abilities of teams during the current season.
15Table 5: Quartile regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Win (d) 0.064 0.046 0.032 0.11*
(0.064) (0.063) (0.042) (0.050)
Tie (d) 0.033 0.047 -0.017 -0.15**
(0.074) (0.073) (0.046) (0.050)
Loss (d) -0.15 -0.15 -0.030 0.052
(0.083) (0.083) (0.051) (0.063)
Marginal e￿ects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes:
Table reports logit regression estimates of the e￿ect of changing the point rule on games outcomes ￿
probability of win, tie, and loss ￿ estimated separately for four equal groups of games. Observations
are split into four quartiles according to the average proportion of the tied games for the away
team in the period before the three-point rule has been introduced. Each element in the table is
estimated by a separate logit regression and reports the change in the probability of the outcome
due to the change in the point rule. All models include time- and team-pair ￿xed e￿ects. Relative
attack and defence variables control for the di￿erence in o￿ensive and defensive abilities of teams
during the current season are included but not reported.
16away strategy resulted in higher number of goals scored by the away teams. At
the same time, no signi￿cant increase in the number of goals scored by the home
teams is found in any country in the sample.
6 Did the three point system in￿uence ￿nal scores?
Table 7 reports the impact of the three-point rule on probability of the ￿nal
score, which is reported at the top of the table. The e￿ect is estimated on the
whole sample, as well as on four sub-samples, selected according to the quar-
tiles of distribution of proportion of ties for an away team computed for the
period before the three-point rule has been introduced. Overall, a 10 percent
lower probability of a 0-0 ourcome is statistically di￿erent from zero at 5 per-
cent con￿dence level. However, looking at estimates for four sub-samples gives
a di￿erent conclusion, the only statistically signi￿cant change after the new rule
has been introduced occurred for the fourth quartile ￿ probability of a 1-1 out-
come declined by 19 percent while probability of a 0-1 outcome increased by 24
percent. There were no statistically signi￿cant shift in the probability of score
outcomes for any other sub-sample.
The signi￿cant shift in the distribution of ￿nal scores from 1-1 to 0-1 can
explain why incentives for more attacking tactics that are present when the
game begins do not lead to more scoring per game. Under the three-point rule,
the away team that scored ￿rst, has stronger incentives to defend 0-1 outcome,
because it protects two points under the three-point rule relative to only one
point under the two-point rule. The change in incentives lead to statistically
signi￿cant drop in 1-1 outcome and increase in 0-1 outcome.
7 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that lack of an aggregate response to a change in a
policy can disguise signi￿cant heterogeneity of responses along some dimensions
that characterize economic agents, ￿rms, or soccer clubs. The same policy can
have counter-balancing e￿ects on two groups of agents with responses that cancel
out each other after aggregation. During a soccer game, the three-point rule
increases incentives to attack while the game is tied, and increases incentives to
protect the current score when the team leads. On average, there is a negligible
e￿ect of the three-point rule on number of goals per game. At the same time,
the two-point rule skewed incentives of away teams in favor of defending the tie,
generating high frequency of outcomes 0-0 and 1-1. The three-point rule has
destroyed those incentives and encouraged away teams to play more aggressively.
In particular, the three-point rule in soccer had a large impact on behavior
of teams that, prior to the new rule, relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics
in away games. The change in behavior of this group led to lower proportion of
ties, more goals scored by away teams, and signi￿cant shift from 1-1 outcome
to 0-1 outcome. Likewise, the national soccer competitions that had higher
17Table 6: Impact of change in the point rule on outcomes by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Win Tie Loss Goals for Goals against
France (a) -0.017 -0.16** 0.21** 0.027 0.20*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.074) (0.095)
Log. like -969.4 -877.4 -613.5 -2739.2 -2078.0
Observations 2354 2192 1711 2715 2638
Germany 0.0092 -0.0099 0.015 0.059 -0.014
(0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.072) (0.084)
Log. like -806.7 -725.8 -587.1 -2495.9 -2085.8
Observations 1956 1822 1593 2318 2288
Italy -0.038 -0.10* 0.18** 0.064 0.41**
(0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.081) (0.098)
Log. like -679.5 -680.3 -479.4 -2067.9 -1700.2
Observations 1683 1668 1340 2116 2067
Netherlands 0.082 -0.10* 0.0018 -0.070 0.075
(0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.067) (0.080)
Log. like -397.6 -355.7 -338.3 -1449.7 -1232.9
Observations 1050 941 907 1371 1366
Poland 0.075 -0.17** 0.12 0.016 0.0035
(0.055) (0.049) (0.064) (0.081) (0.11)
Log. like -525.5 -484.0 -358.3 -1561.9 -1228.8
Observations 1389 1263 998 1749 1653
Portugal -0.022 0.0085 0.024 0.087 0.087
(0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.079) (0.099)
Log. like -319.5 -282.1 -228.7 -1079.3 -827.3
Observations 843 739 625 1204 1104
Romania -0.085 -0.094 0.21** -0.0061 0.36**
(0.054) (0.061) (0.053) (0.070) (0.10)
Log. like -649.5 -513.8 -383.6 -2356.1 -1657.8
Observations 1711 1387 1127 2218 2121
Spain -0.080 0.0021 0.11* 0.089 0.35**
(0.042) (0.047) (0.048) (0.069) (0.085)
Log. like -1037.8 -892.9 -745.1 -3027.3 -2478.2
Observations 2529 2279 2022 2850 2771
Marginal e￿ects; Standard errors in parentheses
(a) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes: Table reports logit (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and poisson (Columns 4 and 5) regression
estimates of the e￿ect of changing the point rule on games outcome - probability of win, tie, and
loss, as well as goals scored for and against the home team for each country in the sample. All
models include time- and team-pair ￿xed e￿ects. Relative attack and defence variables ￿ not
shown in the table ￿ control for the di￿erence in o￿ensive and defensive abilities of teams during
the current season.
18Table 7: Impact of three-point rule on ￿nal scores
Final Score
0-0 0-1 1-0 1-1 1-2 2-1
Whole sample -0.10* 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.007 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
First quartile -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.10
(0.11) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
Second quartile -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 0.10
(0.11) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09)
Third quartile -0.10 0.06 -0.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07)
Fourth quartile -0.07 0.24* 0.05 -0.19** -0.00 0.08
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Marginal e￿ects; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes:
Table reports logit regression estimates of the e￿ect of changing the point rule on the probability
of a particular ￿nal score, shown at the top of the table. E￿ect is estimated on the whole sample,
as well as, on four subsamples split according to quartiles of proportion of ties calculated for away
teams for the period before the new rule has been introduced. All regressions include time- and
team-pair ￿xed e￿ects. Relative attack and defence variables ￿ not reported in the table ￿ control
for the di￿erence in o￿ensive and defensive abilities of teams during the current season.
19proportion of ties before the three-point rule has been introduced, responded
more strongly to the rule change. Interestingly, shifting the away tactics to
more aggressive mode increases both the probability of winning and probability
of loosing the game.
Heterogeneity of responses is measured on within team-pair variation in
teams’ behavior, and accounting for time trend, which allows controlling for
technological progress, development of better managerial practices, and other
factors that can lead to structural changes in game outcomes. In addition,
di￿erent timing of the rule change in the countries represented in the sample,
allows separate the time trend from the e￿ect of the policy change.
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